29 May 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary,

United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT:

Report on Implementation of Recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelli-

gence Activities of the United States

Government

The Director of Central Intelligence desires that each member of the United States Intelligence Board be furnished with a copy, for information, of the subject report which was prepared for him by the Coordination Staff.

50X1


Assistant for Coordination

Attachments:

10 Copies of Report

50X1





OFFICE OF

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington 25, D. C.

1 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Report on Implementation of Recommendations of Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government

1. This is the first report prepared by the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence. It covers the progress made within the intelligence community in implementing the Recommendations of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government, as approved by the President on 18 January 1961. The annexes to this report summarize the action which has been taken with respect to each recommendation. The table below recapitulates the over-all progress which has been made.

Number of recommendations made by Joint Study Group	43
Number deferred by National Security Council (Recommendation No. 35)	1.
Number of recommendations on which initial action has been completed and continuing implementation is in progress (Recommendations No. 16, 41)	2
Number of recommendations which are being implemented when and as required (Recommendations No. 28, 31)	2
Number of recommendations on which action has been initiated (Recommendations No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43)	33

TS #172891 Copy #_/+/

Number of recommendations on which action has not yet been initiated (Recommendations No. 2, 26, 30, 33, 34)

5

Four of the recommendations on which no action has been initiated (Nos. 2, 26, 30 and 34) are considered to be entirely dependent on a decision within the Department of Defense concerning Recommendation No. 1. Action on a fifth recommendation (No. 33) is being temporarily deferred pending the Defense reorganization studies and the augmentation of the Coordination Staff under Recommendation No. 29.

2. The following paragraphs summarize the progress which has been made in the major problem areas identified by the Joint Study Group:

a. Military Intelligence

The Secretary of Defense now has under consideration proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and related comments by other Defense components in response to the Secretary's direction that a concept be developed for an integrated Defense Intelligence Agency. Decision by the Secretary as to implementing the Joint Study Group recommendation for reorganization of Defense intelligence activities will permit subsequent action on allied recommendations dealing with the allocation of resources and improved budgeting procedures. Initial steps towards improved budgeting procedures have sought better comparability by refinements of the combined cryptologic budget and of submissions to the USIB Cost Estimates Committee. Studies have been initiated within the Department of Defense to explore methods of selection and training which could enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty. Action on the recommendation to encourage the maintenance and development of clandestine collection capabilities by the military services is being effected largely by steps to implement other recommendations relating to Defense reorganization, personnel selection and training, and improved field coordination.

b. National Security Agency

The Joint Study Group's recommendation regarding the placing of more ELINT resources under the operational and technical control of the Director, National Security Agency, is now under study and a report will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense. With respect to strengthening the control of the Director of the National Security Agency over the service

- 2 -

cryptologic agencies, operational control lines to field collection units have been made more direct. An appraisal of the adequacy of ELINT research and development programs is under way by members of the Department of Defense. This group has determined that major deficiencies now appear to center on ELINT data processing, analysis and dissemination. The United States Intelligence Board Committee on Communications Intelligence, in coordination with other USIB committees concerned, is examining security clearance standards in an attempt to alleviate the current shortage of foreign born translators.

c. Collection - Resources

Action on the recommendations to increase the qualifications and skills of intelligence personnel, especially in the various fields of collection, has been initiated by the responsible departments and agencies. The National Photographic Intelligence Center has been established. The National Indications Center reports notable improvement in the receipt of requisite information but has deferred a review of its staffing until decisions have been made on Defense intelligence reorganization. The U. S. Intelligence Board has assigned to its Security Committee primary responsibility for reviewing existing compartmentation of sensitive information, and of counterintelligence and security of overseas personnel and installations.

increasing

its intelligence support to certain unified commanders.

d. Requirements and Evaluations

In view of the complex and diverse nature and purposes of existing requirements mechanisms, and the unresolved question regarding the Defense intelligence organization, actions so far taken on coordination of collection requirements have been experimental in nature to determine whether or not requirements can be controlled and indexed by machine methods and to ascertain the practicability of requirements guides on a country by country basis. A more comprehensive draft outline of a community wide requirements system embodying Joint Study Group recommendations has a been prepared by the Coordination Staff and is being reviewed by the agencies concerned. Procedures to carry out the recommendations concerning the responsibility of chiefs of mission overseas to coordinate requirements are being reviewed within the intelligence community.

50X1

50X1

50X1

- 3 -

e. Coordination

As recommended by the Joint Study Group, the Director of Central Intelligence has established, under his personal supervision and separate from the operational responsibility of CIA or other intelligence agencies, a Coordination Staff to assist him in discharging his responsibility for coordinating U. S. foreign intelligence activities. This Staff, înîtially composed of intelligence professionals assigned by CIA, will be given a community-wide character by the detail of qualified individuals from other intelligence agencies.

The Coordination Staff is generally advising and assisting the responsible agencies in implementing the approved Joint Study Group recommendations. It has also taken the lead in initiating action on some recommendations; notably those relating to coordination of collection requirements, evaluation of collection efforts, and USIB review of future plans and programs. This Staff has also on its own initiative submitted a proposal for USIB consideration relating to coordination of new periodic intelligence publications. In addition, the Coordination Staff has participated in advising the \mathtt{DCI} on specific coordination questions, principally concerning clandestine collection activities; and is assisting in the solution of other interagency coordination problems. Review of the USIB committee structure is awaiting the Defense reorganization studies and the strengthened membership of the Coordination Staff.

The Department of State is preparing new instructions to chiefs of missions re-emphasizing their affirmative responsibility to effectively coordinate all overt intelligence collection and reporting activities.

Instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence are in preparation to ensure that, in any unresolved case where a designated representative of the DCI abroad does not concur in a clandestine collection activity proposed by another agency's representative, the issue will be referred to Washington for the attention of the DCI.

f. Cost of Foreign Intelligence Effort

It is contemplated that the Coordination Staff will, in addition to its analysis and review for the United States Intelligence Board of the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community, undertake continuing

_ lı _

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

studies to determine those activities properly categorized as foreign intelligence subject to the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence and the guidance of the United States Intelligence Board. It is expected that these actions by the Coordination Staff will permit the Cost Estimates Committee to develop for the Board an improved pattern for cost and manpower data.

g. Research and Development

A promising start has been made toward identifying the fundamental problems in coordinating research and development related to intelligence and in seeking methods for their solution. The joint work of the Defense and CIA representatives has already resulted in positive benefits, both in mutual understanding, and in establishing useful relationships between working level personnel engaged in similar activities. In the field of communications in particular, coordination has been found to be effective and satisfactory based upon such relationships at the technical level. The Committee on Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board is expanding its efforts to solve the problems of the intelligence community concerned with automatic data and information handling systems.

3. Although, as the recapitulation above and the more detailed information in the annexes indicate, creditable progress has been made, I believe that greater and more intensive efforts must be made by the agencies concerned in fulfilling these approved recommendations.

Assistant for Coordination

Attachment:
Annex

This report is approved:

irector of Central Intelligence

- 5 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1X1

ANNEX

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

- "1. The Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to bring the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense into full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Toward this end:
 - a. there should be established within the Office of the Secretary of Defense a focal point for exerting broad management review authority over military intelligence programs, and providing over-all coordination of all foreign intelligence activities conducted by various Defense components.
 - b. the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in intelligence coordination and operations should be strengthened in support of their assigned mission by such means as:
 - (1) placing under Joint Chiefs of Staff control increased intelligence resources to support its strengthened authority;
 - (2) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence views on substantive intelligence matters within the Department of Defense, notably for estimates;
 - (3) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate military intelligence requirements (see recommendation no. 26 of Section VI);
 - (4) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the intelligence activities of the unified and specified commands and be the primary channel to these commands for guidance and direction of intelligence matters originating with the Department of Defense (see additional discussion and recommendations on Section VII);
 - c. National Security Council Intelligence Directives, Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff directives should be revised in accordance with the above."
 - National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 30, provided that:
 - (a) Implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2 should take place after study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in a manner to be established by the Secretary of Defense.
 - (b) The implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 30, with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense.

Status. On the premise that Recommendation No. 1 is basic to the majority of recommendations relating to or concerning the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense in January 1961 directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to develop a concept for an integrated Defense Intelligence Agency.

A JCS paper was forwarded to the Secretary early in March, setting forth a proposal for a Military Intelligence Agency. This paper was circulated throughout the Department of Defense for study and comment. After analysis of the JCS proposal, together with the several detailed comments mentioned above, the Secretary addressed specific questions to the JCS seeking fuller information about particular aspects of the proposed Agency. As of 15 April 1961, the JCS had provided answers to these questions, and the initiative lay with the Secretary of Defense as to final decision concerning the Department of Defense reorganization required to implement Recommendation No. 1.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

"2. The increased intelligence resources required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands should be drawn from the existing resources of the military departments and component commands as appropriate."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 30, provided that:

- (a) Implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2 should take place after study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in a manner to be established by the Secretary of Defense.
- (b) The implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 30, with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense.

Status. Recommendation No. 2 is considered to be entirely dependent upon a decision with respect to Recommendation No. 1, and consequently no specific action has been initiated.

- 2 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

"3. Budgeting procedures for intelligence operations and activities should be brought more closely under the control of the Secretary of Defense, including clear identification of the total intelligence costs throughout all of the echelons and elements of the Department of Defense."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The Department of Defense has stated that the eventual intelligence organization which emerges in the Department of Defense in accordance with Recommendation No. 1 will be accompanied as a matter of high priority by improved budgeting procedures. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense continues to seek improved bases of comparability by refinements of the combined cryptologic budget and of submissions to the Cost Estimates Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

"4. Policies should be initiated that would permit more rigorous selection and training of personnel assigned to intelligence activities and operations (particularly military attaches) and personnel so assigned should be given position and rank comparable to the operational counterparts."

National Security Action: Concurred.

Status. At the request of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), the military departments have made available a comprehensive statement of policy governing each department's provision for career development of officers who are more than ordinarily involved in intelligence and related activities. These statements, together with related background material, have been analyzed in the Office of Special Operations, and discussions have been initiated with the Office of Manpower, Department of Defense, to explore approaches to improved management principles, including selection and training, which might enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty.

- 3 -

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

"5. The military services should be encouraged to maintain and develop a capability for clandestine intelligence collection which would be carried out under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendation $\overline{\text{No.}}$ 5, with the understanding that this recommendation did not modify the arrangements in this field under wartime conditions.

Status. Efforts to implement this Recommendation have necessarily been limited pending the decisions taken in implementation of Recommendation No. 1. However, the military services are indirectly encouraged to maintain and develop clandestine collection capabilities by the implementation of other Joint Study Group recommendations, namely, those which concern Service personnel selection and career development, training of Service personnel for clandestine intelligence work by CIA, and improved field coordination procedures.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

"6. The Special Security Officer system should:

50X1

- a. avoid duplication of channels to non-military consumers;
- b. be staffed by personnel of rank commensurate with a courier function;
- c. avoid placing their own interpretation on material transmitted by the Special Security Officer systems."

- 4 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7

"7. The Department of Defense re-examine the assignment of Defense ELINT resources to unified and specified commands to determine the feasibility of placing more of these particular resources under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) requested the Director, National Security Agency, to comment on the general subject of electronics intelligence direct support. The Director replied by letter stating that he has directed a study be made to determine areas where an improvement in existing arrangements could benefit all electronics intelligence consumers. A report of the findings of this study will be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8

"8. The Department of Defense review the NSA concept of partnership with the service cryptologic agencies in COMINT and ELINT activities with a view to strengthening the control of the Director of NSA over the service cryptologic agencies."

Mational Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. Even before the issuance of the Joint Study Group Report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had been concerned about developments in the concept of partnership between the National Security Agency and the service cryptologic agencies. As a result of the efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the operational control line from the Director, National Security Agency, to field collection units has been made more direct, while still retaining the organizational relationship between the service cryptologic agencies and those offices in the National Security Agency concerned with Army, Navy, and Air Force matters.

50X1

50X1

- 5 -

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9

"9. The Department of Defense reappraise the adequacy of research and development programs for ELINT purposes with the objectives of developing more adequate ELINT equipment at the earliest feasible time."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) has convened a group composed of representatives from the Office of Special Operations, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and the National Security Agency, to study approaches to the implementation of Recommendation No. 9. Two meetings have been held which have: (a) reviewed with the National Security Agency the capabilities and limitations of existing research and development programs for electronics intelligence (ELINT) purposes; (b) determined that major deficiencies now appear to center on ELINT data processing, analysis and dissemination; (c) report of 1958 in the light of current activities and studies now in progress; (d) generally agreed that qualitative and quantitative aspects of collection capabilities be kept under constant review to ensure proper assignment of priorities and consistency with the current strategic situation.

50X1

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10

"10. USIB reappraise the security clearance standards for foreign born translators to determine whether the current shortage of translators can be alleviated by modified security procedures and practices."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The United States Intelligence Board, in its action of 21 February 1961, assigned to the Committee on Communications Intelligence, in coordination with the Security Committee and the Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, responsibility for developing recommendations for United States Intelligence Board and agency action to implement this recommendation. The National Security Agency is preparing comments on this recommendation for submission to the Committee on Communications Intelligence. Members of the Security Committee have initiated inquiries within their respective departments and agencies to determine

- 6 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

if there is a shortage of translators in areas other than Communications intelligence, and whether or not any shortage is due to security clearance difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 11

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

"12. Military departments should concentrate more effort on career management by developing programs of constantly broadening assignments in intelligence for qualified and specifically designated officers, which will gain the benefits of a career intelligence service without isolating the officer from contact with the general mission of his service and its operations."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. Recommendation No. 12 is closely related to Recommendation No. 4, and both have been studied jointly by the Department of Defense. The Office of Special Operations has initiated discussions with the Office of Manpower to develop management, selection and training principles to enhance the career status and improve the professional competence of individuals assigned to intelligence duty.


- 7 **-**

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/29 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000200070005-8

50X1

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T



RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

"14. The United States Intelligence Board should review existing compartmentation of sensitive information with a view to achieving more uniform practices and ensuring that essential security safeguards do not result in vital information being withheld from officials and organizations with urgent national security responsibilities."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The United States Intelligence Board on 21 February, assigned to the Security Committee, in coordination with the Committee on Communications Intelligence and Committee on Documentation, responsibility for developing recommendations for United States Intelligence Board and agency action regarding this recommendation. The Security Committee has appointed an ad hoc working group to study the problem. This group has held preliminary discussions with representatives of the Committees on Communications Intelligence, Overhead Reconnaissance, and Documentation, and the Watch Committee and obtained their views on this recommendation.

- 8 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDATION NO. 15

"15. The United States Intelligence Board should review the situation in the National Indications Center to determine the adequacy and level of its staffing and to assure that all information pertinent to the National Indications Center's mission (including highly classified and sensitive information now withheld) will be transmitted to the Center promptly on its recempt."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The United States Intelligence Board referred this recommendation to the Watch Committee which, in turn assigned action respensibility to the Director, National Indications Center. The Director of the National Indications Center has indicated that conclusive discussions as to the adequacy and level of staffing of the National Indications Center will not be feasible until the matter of intelligence reorganization within the Department of Defense is settled. The Director of the National Indications Center also states that there has been a recent notable improvement with respect to the receipt by the National Indications Center of sensitive and highly classified information bearing on the Center's mission.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 16

"16. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should consult preparatory to the early preparation of a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive designed to provide authority and assign responsibility for the establishment of a National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC)."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendation No. 16, and approved draft NSCID No. 8 as submitted, with the provision that the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) should be under the Central Intelligence Agency; and noted the President's statement that there should be no other center duplicating the functions of the NPIC, and that the military services and other departments and agencies should state clearly to the NPIC their particular requirements.

Status. A Director of NPIC has been appointed, and an Ad Hoc Planning Board established, consisting of senior representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA, to

serve as an advisory body to the Director, NPTC. This planning board is considering and reviewing significant proposals affecting future NPIC operations, and developing plans covering a variety of special functions. The planning problems studied and resolved, to date, include mission and functions, organizational concept, personnel contributions, photographic analysis procedures, technical development and procurement activities, requirements procedures, and designation of reports.

50X1

RECOMMENDATION NO. 18

"18. The Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on the important area of counterintelligence and security of overseas personnel and installations and assign responsibility for periodic reports to the United States Intelligence Board."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendation No. 18, subject to the deletion of the words "and assign responsibility for periodic reports to the United States Intelligence Board" and the addition of the words "and the agencies concerned should make periodic reports to their agency heads."

- 10 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Status. In its action of 28 February, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) assigned responsibility to its Security Committee, in coordination with the Committee on Communications Intelligence, for the preparation of recommendations for USIB and agency actions. The Security Committee has established an ad hoc working group which has initiated a review of existing security standards and procedures involving overseas personnel and installations. Counterintelligence activities overseas and their relationship to the security of overseas personnel and installations are also being considered.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 19

"19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to encourage the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and military missions within the limits of discretion to exploit intelligence opportunities in close coordination with the military attaches."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently reviewing their directives and procedures governing

requesting the Joint Chiefs to undertake this review, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) has also asked for an evaluation of the indoctrination given by the Military Assistance Institute of the Department of Defense to prospective MAAG and mission personnel. The Office of International Security Affairs is also participating in this review. The Joint Chiefs' report is due on 15 May 1961.


RECOMMENDATION NO. 20

"20. The Central Intelligence Agency should increase intelligence support to unified and component commanders by direct dissemination of all information reports from pertinent field stations."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

- 11 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T



RECOMMENDATIONS NOS. 21, 22, 23

- "21. The United States Intelligence Board establish a central requirements facility, initially to coordinate all requirements levied for clandestine and signal intelligence collection, and if successful, subsequently expand its operations to other types of requirements. Personnel assigned to this facility should be drawn from existing requirements personnel of the member agencies."
- "22. The new central requirements facility use the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Central Reference as its reference facility."
- "23. The United States Intelligence Board establish a program for the integration of all collection requirements manuals into a compatible series of coordinated guides

National Security Council Action: Concurred in principle with Recommendation Nos. 21, 22, and 23, and referred them to the USIB for implementation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Status. Implementation of Recommendation Nos. 21, 22, and 23 will depend to some degree upon the ultimate organization of

- 12 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1

50X1 50X1

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

intelligence within the Department of Defense. The
Coordination Staff, working with representatives of USIB
agencies, has initiated two experiments related to these
recommendations. The first, carried on by the Office of
Central Reference of CTA, is intended to test the feasibility
of controlling, recording, and indexing requirements
The second, is an effort to determine whether it is
feasible to expand the annual intelligence reporting guidance
program for
to include the interests of other agencies and
thus serve as the basis for "integrated requirements guides on
a country by country basis." The Coordination Staff has also
prepared a draft outline of requirements procedures which is
now in the hands of agency representatives for study and comment.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 24

"24. The chief of mission or principal officer in each overseas area should be given affirmative responsibility for coordination of all overt and clandestine intelligence requirements concerning that area."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendation No. 24 subject to the addition of the words "except in situations with respect to which the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence may agree do not warrant such allocation of responsibility."

Status. The Coordination Staff has prepared a draft procedure
for implementing this recommendation, which has been informally
discussed with the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 25

"25. The United States Intelligence Board in its annual evaluation of community effort prepared for the National Security Council pay specific attention to collection, and request similar evaluation from each chief of mission and military command."

- 13 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1

50)50X1 50X1

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. Discussions have been held between the Coordination Staff and the Secretary of the USIB relative to the possibility of implementing this Recommendation in the Status Report to the NSC which will be compiled in the summer of 1961.

While it appears that there is insufficient time to obtain material based on such evaluations world-wide for the up-coming USIB Status Report, it is contemplated that the instructions for that report would, when issued, call for specific attention to collection. In the meantime, the Coordination Staff is studying the over-all problem of community-wide evaluation of collection efforts, with particular reference to the possibility of a comprehensive system for such evaluations. Recommendations will be submitted to the DCI and the USIB on this subject.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 26

"26. All military requirements at the Washington level be coordinated by the Department of Defense so as to prevent duplication or concentration on low priority targets."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

50X1

Status. Pending a decision as to the future organization of intelligence activities in the Department of Defense, no action has been taken on this recommendation.

- 14 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1 50X1

T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDATION NO. 28

"28. The Director of Central Intelligence should take action to achieve more effective coordination within the intelligence community using the normal command channels, as distinct from staff channels, of the departments and agencies concerned."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The Director of Central Intelligence has made increasing use, when appropriate, of command channels for dealing with problems of coordination. For example, the initial steps toward implementing Recommendation Nos. 13 and 39 were so taken. Exchanges of views with respect to Recommendation No. 1 were similarly accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 29

"29. The Director of Central Intelligence should be supported in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions for the problems of coordination by the establishment of a coordination staff, under his personal supervision and separate from any operational responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency or other department or agency. This staff should seek to identify at the earliest possible time and promptly recommend solutions to coordination problems, especially through surveys of intelligence activities as authorized by National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

- 15 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Status. The Director of Central Intelligence has appointed an Assistant for Coordination, a Deputy Assistant for Coordination and three professional staff members from the Central Intelligence Agency. It is planned that the Department of State and the Department of Defense will also be requested to furnish staff members. The staff is largely concerned at present with the implementation of approved recommendations of the Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government. However, as indicated under Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 31 below, this staff is also, on its own initiative, seeking to identify and help to solve inter-agency coordination problems as soon as they arise. In addition the Staff has participated in advising the Director of Central Intelligence on specific coordination questions principally concerning clandestine collection activities.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 30

"30. In phase with the organizational changes in the Department of Defense recommended in Section III, the membership of the United States Intelligence Board should be reduced to four members who shall be the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman), and representative of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with ad hoc representation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendation No. 30, provided that...

(b) the implementation of Recommendation Nos. 1, 2, and 30 with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense.

Status. Of necessity, action with respect to Recommendation No. 30 must await decision as to the organization of intelligence within the Department of Defense.

- 16 -

RECOMMENDATION NO. 31

"31. To strengthen its role in management of the intelligence community, the United States Intelligence Board should establish a management group which would analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems of an administrative or management type. This group would be composed of one senior representative of each member of the United States Intelligence Board."

National Security Council Action: Agreed that, in lieu of establishing the management group proposed in Recommendation No. 31, the functions recommended for that group should be performed by the Coordination Staff proposed in Recommendation No. 29.

Status. This recommendation, as approved, requires the new Coordination Staff to perform the functions envisaged for the proposed management group for the United States Intelligence Board. The staff already has initiated action to analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems of an administrative or management type. For example, the Coordination Staff has initiated a proposal for United States Intelligence Board consideration which, if approved, will provide, that the Coordination Staff review all new plans for periodic intelligence publications in Washington to prevent duplication.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 32

"32. The United States Intelligence Board, through the recommended management group, should review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle. Its views should serve as a basis for guidance and coordination to the intelligence community and for reporting to the National Security Council annually."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

<u>Status</u>. The Director of Central Intelligence has placed before the United States Intelligence Board a proposal which was developed after discussions among the Coordination Staff and staff members of the Bureau of the Budget, the

- 17 -

Departments of State and Defense, and CIA. The proposal provides for submission by each member agency of its anticipated foreign intelligence plans and programs for Fiscal Year 1963. For each program, there would be a statement of objectives, a description of the program, an appraisal of the expected degree of achievement of objectives, principal changes in FY 1963 from 1962, and long range implications for FY 1964 and 1965. The proposed reporting format resembles that in use for submitting foreign intelligence cost estimates to the United States Intelligence Board; and includes estimated foreign intelligence dollar and manpower costs for FY 1961, FY 1962 and FY 1963.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 33

"33. The management group referred to above should review the functions and activities of the several committees and sub-committees of the United States Intelligence Board. This review should include consideration of possible changes in the committee structure and improved reporting procedures."

National Security Council_Action: Concurred.

Status. Action by the Coordination Staff on this recommendation has been temporarily deferred pending the results of study and action on other Joint Study Group Recommendations, especially those relating to Defense reorganization, and the augmentation of the Coordination Staff.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 34

"34. Intelligence guidance and instructions to components of unified commands originating in military departments should be transmitted to these commands through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2)."

National Security Council Action: Concurred in Recommendation No. 34, subject to the addition of the words "or as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct, subject to the understanding that National Security Agency communications to service cryptologic agencies are expepted from the provisions of this recommendation."

- 18 -T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Status. This recommendation is dependent upon a decision as to the organization of intelligence within the Department of Defense, and no action has therefore been initiated.

RECOMMENDATION No. 35

"35. Unified commanders should exercise control and command over the intelligence activities of their component commands and be the primary channel to them for guidance and direction on intelligence matters including any instructions that originate in the service departments."

National Security Council Action: Deferred action.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 36

"36. Chiefs of diplomatic and consular missions abroad should take positive steps to effectively coordinate all overtintelligence collection and reporting activities within their assigned areas of responsibility."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

50X1

Status. The Department of State has prepared a circular instruction to all diplomatic missions abroad re-affirming and re-emphasizing previous directives concerning the affirmative responsibility of chiefs of mission to coordinate overt collection activities overseas. This instruction is now being reviewed by appropriate policy officers within the Department.

- 19 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDATION NO. 38

50X1

- "38. In order to achieve a more effective system for utilizing cost and manpower data in the entire foreign intelligence effort, the United States Intelligence Board should refine and improve its process for preparing and appraising such data by the following means:
 - (a) the United States Intelligence Board's making specific determination as to those activities which properly are foreign intelligence and thus subject to the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence and the guidance of the United States Intelligence Board.
 - (b) based on this determination, the United States Intelligence Board should continue to evolve an improving pattern for the development of cost and manpower data so that the resulting figures will be comparable and will permit the United States Intelligence Board to review and coordinate the effort expended on foreign intelligence activities by the several departments and agencies, especially through the review referred to in Section VII, recommendation no. 32."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. The United States Intelligence Board assigned action responsibility for this recommendation to the Cost Estimates Committee. The Cost Estimates Committee believes that its presently assigned responsibilities

- 20 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

would be inconsistent with the substance of Recommendation No. 38 (a), and has prepared a memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board suggesting that Recommendation No. 38 (a) be referred to the Assistant for Coordination for action. The implementation of Recommendation No. 38 (b) will be undertaken by the Cost Estimates Committee in conjunction with work by the Coordination Staff now in progress on Recommendation No. 32.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 39

"39. The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency should seek means to effect better coordination of their respective research and development activities for intelligence purposes."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. Representatives designated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have organized a small study group to define the scope of the problem presented by Recommendation No. 39, and develop methods for solution. The study group has been briefed on the research and development activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, and will be briefed on other research and development activities of the Department of Defense. The exchange of information thus achieved has already had beneficial results. It has been possible to identify certain specific fields in which coordination at the technical working level is satisfactory, as well as other areas of research and development in which coordination has not been effective. It has also become clear that formal interdepartmental committee structure would not itself provide a solution to the problems of coordinating research and development efforts, and that, on the other hand, there is a need for a strong focal point in the Department of Defense having cognizance of research and development for intelligence purposes, or of value or use to intelligence.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDATION No. 40

"40. The United States Intelligence Board should monitor efforts to develop automatic systems to store and retrieve intelligence information and the extent to which compatibility of systems is assured."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. By its action of 28 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board assigned to its Committee on Documentation responsibility for developing data and recommendations for USIB consideration with respect to this recommendation. The Committee on Documentation, which had already been concerned with automatic data handling systems and problem of compatability between systems as a result of previous USIB instructions, has expanded its investigations with a view toward developing a comprehensive, community-wide approach to the use of modern information handling techniques. It is anticipated that the Committee's annual report due in July, will contain proposals for USIB consideration.

50X1

50X1 50X1

- 22 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

50X1

RECOMMENDATION NO. 43

"43. The Group's last recommendation urges upon the intelligence community that, to a markedly greater extent than it has done, it should establish specific arrangements for planning its work, and anticipating its problems."

National Security Council Action: Concurred.

Status. Activation of the Coordination Staff constitutes a specific arrangement for stimulating and assisting the foreign intelligence community to plan its work and anticipate its problems. The Staff has initiated a proposal to the United States Intelligence Board (designed to implement Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 32) asking them to submit foreign intelligence plans and programs for fiscal year 1963 together with long range implications through fiscal year 1965. It is expected that an analysis of this information by the Board will result in additional arrangements to facilitate planning work and anticipate problems. However, the development of longer range plans such as envisioned in Recommendation No. 43 will require a more thorough examination of present community planning responsibilities and procedures. Upon the acquisition of additional staff members from other areas of the intelligence community, the Coordination Staff will have the capability to undertake an examination of longer range planning and programming and to make recommendations concerning efforts required for more effective long range planning by the intelligence community.

> - 23 -T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

